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Option value, substitutable species and ecosystem services 
 
Introduction 
The value things and events (phenomena) have as means for promoting other phenomena 
with value usually go under the name instrumental value. 
The phenomena that are promoted can in turn also have instrumental value through 
promoting other phenomena with value, and/or they can have value in the form of end value.1 
That something has end value means that it has value as an end in its own right independently 
of whether it promotes anything else with value. What I here call ‘end value’ is sometimes 
referred to as ‘intrinsic value’, but the term ‘intrinsic value’ is given different meanings by 
different authors.2 Several attempts have been made to clear up the confusion,3 though In this 
paper I try to avoid the confusion by instead using the term ‘end value’. 
The instrumental value of a phenomenon is in part determined by the total end value it 
ultimately results in (directly or via a chain of other phenomena with instrumental value), and 
in part of how effective it is at promoting these phenomena. It is, however, also determined 
by the possible existence of alternative means to promote the same phenomena. 
Some phenomena with end value can only be promoted in one way while others can be 
promoted in more than one way. This means that some phenomena that have instrumental 
value are substitutable in relation to a certain end value, while other phenomena with 
instrumental value are not. We therefore need to distinguish between substitutable and non-
substitutable instrumental value. Since one instrumental value can be substitutable in relation 
to one resulting end value and non-substitutable in relation to another, categorising an 
instrumental value as substitutable or non-substitutable should always be done in relation to a 
specified end value. 
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In general, the existence of alternative means for promoting the same end value reduces 
the instrumental value of each of the alternatives. This has implications for, among other 
things, the instrumental value of species in their roles as providers of ecosystem services. The 
concept of ecosystem services was invented to capture the instrumental value of species and 
ecosystems as providers of non-tradable services and not just of tradable goods.4 If a species 
is substitutable as a provider of ecosystem services, it will lead to an automatic reduction of 
its instrumental value, which in turn can lead to a situation where protection of the species 
will get lower priority.5 
It is important, however, to also account for the fact that substitutability does not affect 
the value of the affected species in just one direction. The existence of alternative options can 
in fact be very valuable. In this article I show that the instrumental value of the options 
provided by a substitutable species can be very high. It cannot bring the total instrumental 
value of a substitutable species up to the same level as that of a non-substitutable species, all 
else being equal. It can, however, in many cases bring it up to a level that is higher than the 
total instrumental and end value of the projects that threaten the existence of the species. 
Cod is, for example, a very popular food fish that due to its popularity has become 
threatened by over fishing. The awareness of this has led many consumers to buy other fish 
species instead. Does not the fact that this change was possible show that we do not have to 
worry too much about whether cod disappears as a food source, since there apparently are 
other fish species that can take over the same culinary niche? My suggestion is that the 
answer to this question is no. Instead, what this example shows, is that we should consider 
ourselves very lucky that we had this option and that this shows that the existence of options 
is very important. This in turn tells us that when determining the instrumental value of a 
substitutable species (whether in monetary terms or otherwise), the value of options have to 
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be accounted for, and that it in many cases is important enough to play a decisive role in both 
management and policy decisions. 
 
Option value 
I will call the type of value something has as a provider of options, option value. I see option 
value as a form of instrumental value but do not exclude that it can also be an end value. 
There is for instance an ongoing discussion about whether freedom of choice can have end 
value,6 and since freedom of choice is sometimes defined in terms of a set of options, this 
discussion can partly also be applied on the notion of option value. Here I will, however, only 
discuss option value as an instrumental value, without making any assumptions regarding 
whether or not it can also be an end value. 
The definition of ‘option value’ will thus be: ‘The value something has because it 
provides an alternative way of promoting something else that has instrumental and/or end 
value.’ I choose to talk about options instead of choices, partly to avoid getting stuck in the 
ongoing discussion about how to define ‘choice’, ‘freedom of choice’, etc.,7 and partly 
because the word ‘choice’ conveys the impression that we talk about conscious acts. An 
important part of the option value of substitutable species is formed by their role in providing 
options for evolution and the function of ecosystems. Option value is thus not necessarily a 
matter of active choice. 
Losing the only way of achieving a certain value is always worse than losing one of 
two or more options to achieve the same value. The option value of a substitutable 
phenomenon can therefore not bring its instrumental value up to the same level as that of a 
non-substitutable phenomenon in relation to the same end value, all else being equal. The 
option value can, however, increase the total instrumental value of a phenomenon enough to 
elevate it above some other competing value. This is important when for instance the 
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achievement of a certain value can be achieved by the destruction of a species that can 
provide, but is substitutable in relation to, some ecosystem services. In cases like that it might 
be tempting to argue that the species can be sacrificed because it does not add any value that 
cannot be achieved without the species. 
Some phenomena have both instrumental value and end value. Many things have 
instrumental value in relation to more than one phenomenon with end value. Many end 
values are promoted through a chain of phenomena with instrumental value where one 
phenomenon promotes another and so on until a phenomenon with end value is reached (if 
the phenomenon with end value also has instrumental value, the chain can continue even 
further to achieve another phenomenon with end value and so on). In some cases, the chain 
branches and one phenomenon with instrumental value gives rise to more than one 
phenomenon with end value. 
 
The option value of substitutable species 
Species in their roles as providers of ecosystem services are good illustrations of the practical 
relevance of option value. Species are examples of phenomena that can have both 
instrumental value and end value, and the same goes for individual members of the species. 
Eric Katz has pointed out that assigning value to individual beings based on their function in 
a larger system has the disadvantage of only focusing on their instrumental value while 
ignoring their end value (he uses the term ‘intrinsic value’), and that this exclusive focus on 
instrumental value opens up for the substitutability problem.8 His criticism is aimed at 
holistic theories of environmental ethics, but it seems equally applicable to the ecosystem 
service concept. In principle I agree with his conclusion and I fully agree that we need to put 
more focus on the end value, not just the instrumental value, of both species and individuals. 
Since the ecosystem concept has become very influential with decision makers, I also think it 
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is important, however, to try to mitigate the substitution problem in that context. Though I 
belong to those who find both species and individual non-human living beings valuable as 
ends, this is not agreed upon by everyone. The survival of most species therefore, in practice 
relies on them having instrumental value in relation to something else that human beings 
value as an end. This can be done by providing goods such as timber, food or energy, or by 
providing services such as pollination or carbon sequestration.9 The term ‘ecosystem 
services’ is sometimes limited to the provision of services and sometimes comprises the 
provision of goods as well as services. In this text it does not matter whether we include 
goods or not, the reasoning will be the same. 
There are different opinions regarding the substitutability of ecosystem services, though 
there seems to be strong evidence that they in many cases are irreplaceable, and in most other 
cases, very difficult and costly to replace.10 Usually an ecosystem service does not stand or 
fall with one species, however. This means that, from an ecosystem service perspective, 
many species are substitutable. If one species disappears, others can be relied upon to provide 
the same service or play the same role in the ecosystem that supplies the service. According 
to one estimate, as much as 20-50% of the species in an ecosystem can disappear before the 
species loss constitutes any threat to the system.11 
This kind of substitutability is sometimes used as an argument against the allocation of 
resources on conservation of species that cannot be shown to be irreplaceable as providers of 
an ecosystem service. I will argue, however, that substitutability can also add value to a 
species in the form of option value. This will not bring the value of substitutable species up to 
the same level as that of non-substitutable species, but it can in many cases make the 
substitutable species valuable enough from an ecosystem service perspective to elevate the 
instrumental value of these species above the competing value that would be realized by 
projects that threaten to cause the species to go extinct. 
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The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report points out that the stability of 
ecosystems is, apart from its other values, also important for what they call “freedom of 
choice and action”, defined as “opportunity to be able to achieve what an individual values 
doing and being”.12 They argue that losing biodiversity is therefore also in many cases a loss 
of choices.13 
Bryan Norton and Gretchen Daily reason along the same lines as the millennium 
assessors, but focus more directly on species.14 Norton points out that if we sacrifice a species 
for short-term gains, we also sacrifice what he calls “future options of the human race”.15 The 
type of value that Daily, Norton and the Millennium assessors talk about are good examples 
of option value, since what have value in both cases are the options presented by the species. 
The existence of alternative ways of providing ecosystem services is instrumentally 
valuable because things have a tendency to change. Both individual human beings and 
humanity as a whole, as well as the world around us, are subject to change. We do not know 
what preferences we, or coming generations, will have in the future.16 Also, we do not know 
what challenges we or coming generations will have to face in the future.17 
One particular type of challenge that we face more and more regularly due to the 
increased extinction rate is in the form of a loss of species that perform ecosystem services.18 
The existence of options in the form of more than one species that can perform the same 
service, or play the same role in the performance of the service, is a way of handling the loss 
of service providers. 
The challenge can also be in the form of changing external conditions, for instance in 
the form of climate change. In these situations, it is important to have access to options that 
can provide or contribute to the provision of the same ecosystem service under different 
conditions. 
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In a report to the Nordic Genetic Resource Center 2010, I showed that access to plant 
genetic resources of both cultivated and wild relatives of our most important food crops will 
for instance be absolutely vital for our ability to deal with the expected climate change.19 This 
is particularly true in light of the predicted increase in weather fluctuations within and 
between areas and seasons. This means that it is of great importance for both the individual 
farmer, and the society to increase the presently very low degree of genetic diversity among 
the crops that are grown for food today. Since it will be harder to predict exactly what kind of 
climate related disturbances (including everything from changes in precipitation to swarms of 
insects) that will affect a country, a region or a particular farm during a particular season, it is 
important to, so to speak, not put all your eggs in the same basket, but to grow a larger 
variety of crops that can survive different kinds of disturbances. 
It might seem reasonable to qualify option value according to how good the option is at 
providing the service in question, just as instrumental value in general depends on the ability 
to promote a certain end value. If, for instance, two species are equally good at providing a 
service, they should have the same option value, while if one species is better than the other, 
the other species does provide an option but a less good option, and should therefore have a 
lower option value. On the other hand, options are valuable because things change. This is 
not least true in nature, and especially during the present era when human encroachments 
cause changes in nature at an unprecedented rate. This means that an option that is inferior 
just now might soon be superior. This is an important feature of option value and has to be 
accounted for. Since we cannot predict which options will be superior even in the near future 
and much less in a more distant future, I suggest that we do not grade options based on their 
present usefulness as options. 
Having more than one option is a well-established and sensible risk management 
strategy. Having access to more options makes us less vulnerable if things do not go as 
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expected. In agriculture, access to a variety of crops gives the farmer a larger set of options 
with regard to what to grow. Thereby, the farmer also becomes less vulnerable to changes, 
and gains control over his existence. We could argue in the same way concerning most uses 
of other species – as providers of food, timber, bio-energy, medicine, aesthetic experiences, 
etc. A larger selection of species gives us more options from which to choose. A species that 
has instrumental value and is substitutable will thereby also have option value through its 
contribution to our set of options from which to choose. It will therefore never be really 
redundant even if there are other ways of getting hold of the value that the species in question 
provides. If we lose a species that is instrumentally valuable but substitutable in relation to a 
certain end value, we have other ways of achieving that end value but we have none the less 
lost option value. The service that provides the value can be upheld even if one of the species 
that supply it disappears, but the number of different suppliers of the service, and therefore 
our set of options, has been reduced. 
Species have option value in relation to our active choices of species as providers of 
different goods and services, but also in relation to their roles in the ecosystems. We can 
choose which species to use for instance for production of timber or for admiring through our 
binoculars during a hike, but most ecosystem services are indirect effects of how the 
ecosystems work. The species behind most ecosystem services are therefore not subject to 
active choice by us. We can still talk about them as having option value, however. When the 
ecosystem provides ecosystem services for us, the involved species have option value to us 
even though they do not directly provide us with any options to actively choose from. If two 
species are substitutable in relation to a certain service and one of them disappears or 
becomes significantly weakened, the other species will be able to take over its role as a 
supplier of the ecosystem service or its role in the ecosystem that provides the service even 
without any active interference by us. 
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The option value of money 
On the other hand, in many cases we lose species because of a process that generates 
something else that increases our set of options in another way or in another area. This means 
that option value will appear on both sides of the conflict. 
The project that causes the extinction might for instance generate substantial amounts 
of money. Money represents a kind of universal instrumental value that can be transformed 
into many other phenomena with instrumental or end value. This means that money 
represents, in a way, the “ultimate option value”. This makes money a very difficult 
competitor in all cases of trade-off when we value a large set of options. In today’s society, it 
seems like this particular quality in money – its exchangeability into an incredibly large 
number of other values – has made it the most sought after commodity. We spend most of 
our lives pursuing, not things we value as ends, but money.20 Once we have the money we 
can exchange it for the things we really want. This looks like a detour, but instead of aiming 
directly for what we want, we go via money, not only because we know that we can get more 
of what we value by earning more money, but also because the money represents many 
different values. If we exchange a horse for a cow we have got a cow, but if we exchange a 
horse for money we can choose what to buy with the money. We can split it into many small 
sums and buy many less expensive things, or we can save it and add to it by selling more 
horses, and then buy something more expensive. We can sell to one person and use the 
money we get to buy from another person at another place and another time. Money is thus 
more flexible than goods in all of these ways. This means that just by exchanging a service or 
a commodity for money instead of another service or commodity and instead of keeping the 
original service or commodity, we tend to gain option value. Exchanging goods or services 
for money has been a manifestly successful way for people to increase their set of options, so 
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successful even, that it has a tendency to make people forget about both the cases where the 
thing we want cannot be bought for money, and the cases where our options get diminished 
by the process. 
 
Substitutable species and the option value of money 
In light of what was just said about money as the ultimate option value, it might seem 
difficult to maintain that we, all in all, lose more option value than we gain by, so to speak, 
“transferring species into money”, that is, by doing something that increases our economic 
wealth while causing species to go extinct. 
However, in order for money to keep its option value, the things we like to buy with the 
money have to exist. The economic value of money is only as large as the value of the things 
one can buy with the money. This is why just printing more money without a corresponding 
increase in production only leads to a decrease in the economic value of the currency. In the 
same way, the instrumental value of money is determined by the end value it can provide for 
us, and the option value of money is only as great as the set of optional ways it provides for 
promoting phenomena with end value. If we cause a species to go extinct, we permanently 
remove one thing from the world and thereby make it impossible for anyone to utilise it.21 
This means that when you make money in a way that causes a species to go extinct, you also 
decrease the number of options that the money represents (in the form of options for 
ecosystem services, food, material, aesthetic experiences, etc.) for everyone. Causing a 
species to go extinct therefore decreases the option value of money. The cod from the 
example in the introduction is a case in point. If we lose the cod, there is one less food item I 
can buy with my money, which means the option value of money has decreased. 
Even so, one might argue that the decrease of the option value of money that results 
from the removal of a species is probably not very big considering how many other things 
11 
 
you can get for your money, and especially considering that species and the ecosystem 
services provided by species are usually not bought and sold for money anyway (we can buy 
cod, but what about for instance the pollination service provided by wild bees?). 
On the other hand, the services provided by the species are sometimes necessary for the 
maintenance and/or production of many things that are high in demand and that can be traded 
for money, such as food and wood (the pollination service provided by wild bees transfers 
into a large variety food crops that are traded on the market). 
When substitutable species are sacrificed to increase someone’s economic wealth, there 
is also another problem, and that is the decrease it causes in global option value. We need to 
distinguish between (I) increasing or decreasing option value on the personal scale (personal 
option value), that is, increasing or decreasing one’s own access to existing options by, for 
instance, making or losing money, and (II) increasing or decreasing option value on the 
global scale (global option value) by increasing or decreasing the total number of alternative 
ways of promoting end values in the world. It is perfectly possible to increase one while 
decreasing the other. A fisherman might gain personal option value by transferring cod in the 
ocean into money in his wallet, but the global option value of the money in his and everyone 
else’s wallet is diminished in the process. We also need to distinguish between (A) situations 
where someone increases personal option value by creating, or at least not decreasing, global 
option value, for instance by getting paid in exchange for something that she has created – 
and (B) situations where someone increases personal option value in a way that decreases 
global option value, for instance by making money in a way that leads to irreversible 
destruction or depletion of something else (for example cod or any other species). 
An increase in option value on the personal scale can thus increase or decrease option 
value on the global scale. An immediate increase in personal option value by means that 
decrease the global option value has the potential to decrease other people’s personal option 
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value and to limit everyone’s chances of further increasing their personal option value. It can 
even turn the causing individual’s immediate increase in personal option value into a loss in 
the long run. 
Very often, however, the same project both creates and destroys options on the global 
scale. We might for instance cause extinction when we produce new consumer goods. Would 
it then not provide more option value on the global scale to produce more goods for the 
consumer to choose from than we lose in the form of extinct species? Would we for instance 
not create more option value on the global scale by producing ten new car models to choose 
from than by preserving one substitutable species? 
I would say no for two reasons: 
1. Extinction is irreversible, while a decision not to produce a new car model or any 
other new model of consumer goods is reversible. 2. Species and the ecosystem services they 
provide are the basis for many value chains. They thereby provide options for more values 
compared to new car models and other kinds of consumer goods that are usually found close 
to the end of their value chains. 
 
1. Extinction is irreversible 
When a species goes extinct it will be gone forever. It is sometimes argued that projects that 
destroy nature but increase economic growth may not be a big problem because it is always 
possible to use the money we gain to repair the damage.22 This is not possible when the 
destruction results in extinction. There are many things money cannot buy,23 but the most 
important of them might be extinct species. Several attempts have been made to resurrect 
extinct species, but so far none has been successful – and it might never happen. 
An important complicating factor is that cloning is only possible if we have access to 
preserved DNA. In some cases, it is also necessary to find living relatives that can serve as 
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surrogate mothers and maybe even as adoptive parents. Another limiting factor is that some 
species are so to speak “more than their genes”. That is, some of the information that governs 
their behaviour is stored, not in their genes, but in their brains, and is passed on from 
generation to generation by the older animals showing the young. If the species goes extinct, 
this information will be irretrievably lost even if the information in the genes can be 
retrieved. 
Even if it will eventually be possible to resurrect extinct species, there is no guarantee 
that a resurrected species can be reintroduced to its habitat and thereby take back its role in 
the ecosystem. In many cases, the species has gone extinct because its habitat has 
disappeared. This means that if we do not also recreate the habitat, which might involve the 
resurrection of several other species, there will be no future for the species in question even if 
it can be resurrected. In some cases it might be possible to keep the species in containment, 
but then it will have small chances to play any part in providing any ecosystem service. 
Even the reintroduction of locally extinct species that are gone from one area but still 
exist in other areas have proven to be very costly and have a low success rate.24 
Reintroduction of species that have become globally extinct, and therefore have not had any 
opportunity to evolve together with the ecosystem during the time they were gone, must 
reasonably be even more difficult and may even cause new problems in the ecosystem to 
which they are reintroduced. One important problem is that the environment may have 
changed while the species was gone.25 The niche that the species used to occupy might, for 
example, have been taken over by another species.26 This means that the resurrect species 
will be introduced to a system that it is no longer adapted to, or rather to a system that is no 
longer adapted to the species. This in turn increases the probability that the reintroduction 
will fail. It also means that if it works, it will inevitably interfere with the new order in the 
system, and it might affect species that have evolved in new directions after the extinction of 
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the species we want to reintroduce. The reintroduced species might for example behave like 
an invasive species in the system. This in turn evokes new ethical questions. Is it, for 
instance, ethically acceptable to cause the extinction of an existing species in order to 
reintroduce a species that has gone extinct but has been resurrected? 
Depending on what species concept one adheres to, it might in fact be impossible per 
definition to revive an extinct species. If we see species as individuals,27 or historical 
lineages,28 instead of, for example, classes or natural kinds, a once extinct species will be 
gone forever even if it would be possible to create an exact replica of the species, just as a 
dead person would still be dead even if we could take her DNA and make a clone. The clone 
would have much in common with the dead person before she died, but it would not be the 
same person. The last objection might just be a real problem if we consider the end value of 
species, since the individuals in question cold play the same role in an ecosystem whether 
they count as the same species or not. The other objections, however, seem to be highly 
relevant for whether we can count on species revival to get back lost options or not, and it 
seems in conclusion that because of these and probably also other hitherto unknown 
problems, resurrecting species may never be a real alternative. The irreversibility of 
extinction is thus something we must consider a reality when we talk about possible 
contributors to ecosystem services. 
There is (in general) no such thing involved when we lose money or abstain from 
producing another model of some consumer goods. If we miss an opportunity to make 
money, we can with few exceptions make money some other time and some other way. If a 
new car model or brand of soap is not made available on the market today, we can produce 
the car or the soap some other time if we choose to do so. If we cause the extinction of a 
species on the other hand, we can probably never get it back no matter how much money we 
have. That extinction is forever seems to be a very important reason for why species 
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extinction is considered such a bad thing.29 In our case, it means that if a substitutable species 
goes extinct, option value is lost in a more fundamental way compared to when we abstain 
from making money or from introducing a new car model. 
 
2. Species are at the basis of many value chains 
So far we have been occupied with situations where the same end value can be 
promoted in more than one way, that is, where more than one value chain terminates in the 
same end value. On the other hand, some instrumental values can promote more than one end 
value.30 This means that one phenomenon with instrumental value can start several value 
chains terminating in different end values. This is also the case with phenomena that have 
substitutable instrumental value, in which case they are substitutable as providers of more 
than one other value. These value chains can in turn branch into even more value chains, 
eventually ending up in several different end values. Ecosystem services are often of this 
kind. Ecosystem services and the species that provide them are typically launching many 
value chains of which several have to do with our very survival, which in turn is necessary to 
realise most end values. 
Substitutable species thus provide option value in relation to many other instrumental 
values that in many cases are substitutable in relation to other values, etc., until they emanate 
in a large number of different end values. This means that preserving the species will in effect 
provide options not just to the ecosystem in the form of a set of species that can take on the 
same function. They also help create options on several levels in relation to several other 
phenomena with instrumental value that in turn create options in relation to another level of 
resulting phenomena with instrumental values, and so on until we reach the end values. 
Because they eventually emanate in phenomena that have end value to us, all these options 
provide option value to us. Some ecosystem services are essential for our survival, which in 
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turn is essential for the realisation of most things we value as ends. Species that provide 
options in relation to these ecosystem services provide options for options for options, etc. in 
relation to a large number of end values for all of us. 
The more end value the resulting phenomenon has, the higher the instrumental value of 
the alternative means for promoting it, everything else being equal. This includes the option 
value for substitutable means. Creating a new car model to choose from creates option value 
for those who attach end value to cars, or to what the cars in their turn can promote (and who 
can afford the car in question). Preserving a species that constitutes an alternative way of 
promoting an ecosystem service that is essential for our survival creates option value for 
everyone who attaches end value to their lives, or to activities for which being alive is 
necessary. 
Plants maybe most obvious example of how species can have a very high option value 
by being substitutable in relation to a certain ecosystem service that in turn promotes many 
different end values. Plants are in fact due to their role as primary producers at the bottom of 
most value chains. Birds who excavate and maintain cavities that can eventually be taken 
over by other species that in turn play different roles in the ecosystem,31 are typically found a 
bit higher up in the value chain but are still sufficiently close to the basis of the chains to be 
good examples of species that provide option value that has the ability to multiply as it 
transfers up the value chain. The higher up in the value chain we find a certain phenomenon, 
the fewer end values it typically provides options for, however. Phenomena that provide 
options on a more basic level, like species and ecosystems, typically have option value in 
relation to more phenomena with end value compared to phenomena very close to the end of 
the value chain, such as immediately consumable goods. Provision of options for a higher 
number of phenomena with end value potentially means provision of options for more total 
end value. 
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This means that the total sum of option value created by a species that provides an 
alternative way of performing an ecosystem service, that in turn is essential to, or provides an 
option for, the promotion of a wide range of important end values, will with a wide margin 
outweigh the option value of having another car model, or ten new car models, or any other 
goods that might compete with the preservation of the species. It will also outweigh the 
instrumental value and end value of most projects that threaten the existence of the species. 
It is in fact a tell-tale sign of many ecosystem services that they do promote many end 
values. A tree can be used to make wood that in turn can be used for a whole range of things 
that promote value for us, but it can also be left standing and promote other values, including 
oxygen, climate regulation, aesthetic experiences and habitat for other species. 
The most obvious examples of ecosystem services that promote a multitude of end 
values are ecosystem services that are important for our survival, which in turn is a necessary 
prerequisite for the realisation of most things we value as ends.32 We could even go so far as 
saying that in spite of what we found above about money, money is not the ultimate option 
value after all. Phenomena that provide options for our survival is. Since providers of options 
for securing our survival enables the realisation of most of the things we value as ends, 
species that provide ecosystem services that provide options for our survival, must reasonably 
be very hard to beat as providers of option value. 
The best illustration for our purposes is maybe pollination. Pollination performed by 
wild animals has turned out to be very important for our food production, which in turn is 
very important for our survival, which in turn is necessary for the realisation of most things 
we value as ends. The animals who perform this service in turn depend on other ecosystem 
services in the form of food, habitats, etc. Most of the services on each level are more or less 
substitutable, but the existence of more than one option for delivering each service is very 
valuable for the functioning of the entire web. The estimates of the importance of animal 
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pollination differ. According to one source, almost all flowering plant species in the tropical 
rainforest and almost 90% of all flowering plants worldwide depend on pollination by 
animals.33 Another source reports that 65% of all flowering plants and 75% of all food crops 
in the world depend on pollination by animals.34 Either way, it seems clear that pollination 
provides quite a lot of options when it comes to food crops, that in turn provide optional food 
sources, that promote our survival. 
In particular, wild bees are very important pollinators,35 not just in the tropics but all 
over the world.36 There are many pollinating bee species in the world, which means there is a 
large degree of redundancy, though different species differ in efficiency. One study shows for 
instance that for highland coffee, wild bees are more efficient pollinators than honey bees and 
solitary bees are more efficient than social bees.37 The order might differ between crops (and 
probably also between geographical regions), but it tells us that different bee species have 
different instrumental value as pollinators. As we noted earlier, however, the option value of 
a species should not depend on a species’ relative efficiency in performing a particular 
service. The option value of social bees (to take the coffee example above) needs to be 
determined based on their role as options if the more efficient solutions (in this case, the 
solitary bees) disappear. 
If we continue down the value chain we will find that different bee species prefer 
different species of flowers, and flowers of different height and flowers grouped in different 
ways (small groups vs. large groups).38 Some species are very picky when it comes to host 
species, which means that they have fewer options. In some cases, even one lost host species 
can be the nail in the coffin for an entire bee species. Even for more generalist species it is 
important not to diminish their options, however. Burkle et al. have shown that the abundance 
of bees in Illinois, USA has decreased significantly during the last 120 years. Generalist 
species that have a larger variety of food sources to choose from fared better than the 
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specialists, which shows the value of options. Also the generalist species in Burkle et al.’s 
study were affected, however. They came to have fewer options, which made them more 
vulnerable to other changes in the environment.39 Preserving options for wild bees in the 
form of substitutable host plants and other important parts of their environment thus helps 
preserve viable populations of many different bee species, which in turn can pollinate a larger 
set of different crop species. The crop species in turn provide options for us in the form of 
what to grow and what food to eat, which can be very important both economically in order 
for the farmer to deal with changes in the environment, including climate change and new 
crop diseases, and ultimately for the consumers whose survival and prosper depends on a 
reliable access to food. This means that not just the bees but also the species that provide 
options for the bees to survive have option value for us in relation to all end values that 
presuppose our survival. 
 
Adding a non-anthropocentric perspective 
That substitutable species provide options to ecosystems and the evolutionary process does 
not mean that substitutable species have option value for ecosystems and the evolutionary 
process. It means, however, that by providing options to ecosystems and the evolutionary 
process they create option value for us. ‘Us’ does not necessarily refer only to human beings, 
however. Humans are not the only beings to whom things have value. All beings who have a 
perspective from which things can be good or bad (that is, all sentient beings) are beings to 
whom things can have value. Because substitutable species constitute options for providing 
ecosystem services to all living beings, substitutable species reasonably have option value 
also to non-human sentient beings. 
Even from a strict anthropocentric perspective the option value provided by 
substitutable species is considerable. If we take on a wider perspective and include the option 
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value substitutable species can have also for other sentient beings (as potential food sources 
for example), the total sum of option value provided by substitutable species will be even 
larger, not least considering that not only humans, but all sentient beings depend on 
ecosystem services for their survival, which as we have seen, in turn is a necessary 
prerequisite for the realisation of most end values. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
A phenomenon that has value as an end in its own right is said to have end value. A 
phenomenon that promotes other phenomena with value is said to have instrumental value. 
How high the instrumental value is, depends partly on the end value of the phenomena that it 
promotes directly or through a chain of successive phenomena with instrumental value. It 
also depends on how good the phenomenon in question is at promoting these phenomena and 
on the existence of alternative means for promoting them. If there are alternative ways to 
promote a certain phenomenon with end value, the instrumental value of each of the 
alternatives is lower than if there is only one way of promoting the end value. The existence 
of alternatives can also have value, however. I call this type of value option value. 
The instrumental value of ecosystem services is typically very high, not least since they 
are important for our survival, which in addition to being highly valued for its own sake by 
most of us, also is necessary for the realisation of most other things we value as ends. This 
means that species that perform the services also have a high instrumental value. In most 
cases, ecosystem services can be performed by more than one species, however. This is 
sometimes used as an argument that we do not have to preserve all the species that can 
provide the service. Having access to alternative providers of important ecosystem services 
constitutes a high option value, however. In this paper, we have shown how species that are 
substitutable as providers of ecosystem services can have a very high option value that helps 
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elevate the total instrumental value of these species to a level that is typically much higher 
than the total value of phenomena that might threaten the existence of the species. 
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